























INFORUANTS AND PROBABI,E CAUSI.: AI.'TI.:R
I'IAS ! 4C_H t I s E_TLS_[ , _ -Ul:Q[
Sine.e the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
i n _T!1-!nqis v_r_-.!q_t,ss_ [103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983)l much ttncertainty has arisen in
Jegal and law enforcement circlcs concern-
ing t,he effect of the ruling on det.r.rt:mi -
naLions of probable causo for warrants
bared on informant infot'maLion. Spcci-
fically the quesLion has arisen whetltcr Lhe
4gqi_f_qr - Sginelli " two-pronged" lest for
infornanL reliability is stiI1 to be used,
as modified by the Gat,eq "Lot.ality of cir-
cumstances" tesI or whether Aggilar
FprngLli has been laid Lo rest. A brief
recap of those^!ests is as follows;'
f n l h(f ('.ases of-Aguilar v. Texas [378
U.S. 108 (1964)l and Sping$-! v.--U.s. [393
U.S. 410 (1969)1, the U.S. Suprene Court
created a "Lwo-pronged" rule for the usc of
i nformant information in the est.abliqhment
of probable cause for soarch or arresL hrar-
rAnts. Quite simPJV, the rule saicl L.hat
,informant informat,ion sEandint gllne nay be
used to establish probable cause for a war-
rant if lwo prongs were satisfied: 1) Tho
basi:; of knowledge of the informant hlas cs-
tablished for Lho person determining proba-
ble cauSe (e.9., magistraLe). That is to
sf,I , "Hohl doc's Lhe informant knt:w t.he in-
fornation reporled lo be true?" 2l The re'
liability and credibilit,y of the infr.rrmatrL
was estnbl ished as well. That is t.o say,
"l,Ihy shoulcl the inf ormant's inf ormat.ion be
be1 i eved?"
In lllinois v. Ga!gs-, the U.S. Suprome
Court re-exami ned th i r; " i wo -pronged" Lest
and ckrr:ided that it should be replaced with
a "l.ot.ali ty of the circumstances" LcsL in
ln att e66orr.t. to belttn
di.ttuninnte i"nioturat i-on on k4al
matlctu that a66eet. Istr ut$orlce'
mett od(Lcera, u,g aLe pl?4ed to
p,LeAent tn gou the LEGAL Lffi.
Thi^t pubUla.tion will be
nad.e availnhLe to Aou on a te4ulttt
ba,tit.
Youa eonnentt dnd, Suggutiotra
(on (u.ttttte iAuuu ute tolLottel.
Cotaupondenee thoull' be a.ddneuel




which an infqrmanl's, basis qf knowledge
(prong 1) and reliability and qredihiliLy
(prong, 2) were to be matters considcred in
tla Jetermination of pno,bable cause but
gfi r., rrr)t'to be seen as "strictly separate
reguirenents" upon which a deternination of
probable cause had to rest.
Af trlr the G€r!g!i. decision many courts con-
[inuecl Lo rule that t,he Aguilar - Soinelli
test for infornant's information was alive
and well but was modif ied by Ga!-eS so that
the test had now becone a "two-pr<lttged"
LcsL which looked to Bhe "totalit'y of the
circumstances" in deternining whether bolh
pronts were sat.isfiod.
I other words, af ter G-Ses, a nagistrate
couicl. look at all infornaLion availablc in
delc'rmining whe[her both prongs of the
Agur 1 aq_:--Ep-t-ne.1-U. Lest were sati sf iod.
Thrrs, if the "basis of knowledge] prong of
the test was very weak many court,s held
t,hat probabl e cause could nonetheless be
forrnd if, under Lhe "t,otalit.y of the circun-
stances", Lhe "reliability and credibili-
ty" prong hras so etrong so as to overcome
t,he ureak f irst prong. This interpretation
of the effect of pates left law cnforcement
in an area of great uncertainty.
Any uncertainty which was created by
Gates has now been clearr+d up by the U,S.
Supreme Court. In its decision in l{assa-
chuqe!!g_J._!&.!eg (35 CrI. 4044-llay L4,
1984), the high court lays to rest eny
not,ion Lhat Aguilar Spinelli is alive or
wel1. The court states, "hre did not nerely
refine or qualify the 'two-pronged test'
[in Gatesl. lrle rejecjed it as hypertechni-
cal and divorced frorn t,he 'factual and
practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not
legal technicians, acL"'. IUpton at 4044,
quoting lrinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 150
(I-949), (enphasis suppl ied) l.
Thus the Suprerne Court buried, once and
for all, 8trV speculation that law cn-
forcement officers are subJect to Lhe
"two-pronged" test of Ag,uilar - Spinelli in
seeking rrarrants based on informant in-
for-mation. The new "totality of circum-
stances" rule says that a magistraLe nust
make a determination of probable cause
based upon the totality of the infornation
available. No longer is an independent
shoning of informant knowledge and credi-
bilily required where the circumstances, as
a who1e, indicate a "substantial basis" for
a finding of probable cause. Thus the
court left the deterninaLion squarely with-
in the discretion of the magistrate without
the restraints of the "two-pronged" test.
The court also criticized reviewing
courts for holding afLer-the-fact de novo
hearings to determine probable cause, and
stated such action is "inconsistent both
with the desire to encourate use of the
warrant process by police officers and with
the recognition that once a $arrant hag
been obtained, intrusion upon lnterests
protected by the Fourth Anendrnent is less
severe than otherwige nay be the case."
A magistrate need nerely decide, based on
infornratlon presented, rhether lt ls nore
likely than not that, either the person to
be eharged comnitted the crlme or the plaee
to be searched containe contraband or evl- _
dence of a crlne. This nen epproach allows
law enforcement officers to present all the
pertinent pieces of information collected
from an inforrnent in an investlgation.Eo
att,enpt to persuade a rnagistrate of the
presence of probable cause rather than be
linited strictly to a showing of the in-
formant's credibility and the basla of his
knowledge.
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